In October 2015, for the first time in the history of democratic Poland, a single political party, the right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), gained a majority in both chambers of Parliament. The party secured support from 37.6 % of the total votes (approximately 20% of those eligible to vote, which equates to less than 6 million people). However, thanks to the Polish electoral system, that was sufficient to seize full control. PiS interpreted the election results as a mandate—or as they call it, “the Sovereign’s will”—to reconstruct the prevailing political and social order. The conservative revolution began. They sustained power over two consecutive parliamentary terms. Concurrently, PiS’s presidential candidate Andrzej Duda triumphed in both the 2016 and the 2021 election, solidifying their hold on legislative processes and executive authority. However, on October 15, 2023, PiS was defeated by a coalition of four parties. The demand for political change among Poles was very strong, as voter turnout reached almost 75% (the highest score in the history of democratic Poland), and support for PiS dropped to 35.4 % of the votes.[1] The shift notwithstanding, it is still an impressive result, and President Duda, whose tenure extends until June 2025, continues to safeguard PiS interests and employs his prerogatives to thwart legislative changes.
I will first briefly outline the consequences for Poland of the eight-year conservative revolution, particularly its impact on culture. I will then delve into an analysis of the cultural counter-policy that has been introduced by the new government, with a specific focus on the Zachęta National Gallery in Warsaw, a pivotal institution of visual art in Poland. In this analysis, I will draw upon Louis Althusser’s influential essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”
De-forming Liberal Democracy – State Apparatuses under the Rule of PiS
Marxist classics defined the State Apparatus as a force of repressive execution and intervention, embodied by the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc. Althusser called it the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) and added to it another reality, that of the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs). These are distinct and specialized institutions, such as the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA, the cultural ISA. Althusser stated these institutions operate primarily through ideology, but they also have a secondary role in repression, the whole point of the State Apparatuses being the reproduction of the hegemonic socio-economic order, which in contemporary times is rooted in the capitalist relation of exploitation.[2] I will not question that purpose and will not focus on class struggles—there being no serious political force in Poland to question capitalist relations of production—and will concentrate instead on the political utilization of the Apparatuses within liberal democracy, which is an emanation of the capitalist system. It is evident that political fluctuations within this system might exert an influence on the structure of the political regime, the scope of human rights, the shape of civil society and the prevailing discourse.
Following the 2015 elections, PiS attempted to dominate the political and legal Ideological Apparatuses, which set a systemic framework within which the remaining ISAs and the RSA functioned. Simultaneously, all the apparatuses were utilized by PiS to construct a conservative national-Catholic hegemony. By hegemony I mean a particular way of defining what is social, which begins to function as a universality. Hegemonic politics involve constructing a social identity that is based on an equivalence between certain elements that exclude or manifest other, opposing elements. Hegemony enables the transformation of categories of political discourse and the introduction of its own definition of reality.[3] Of course, what with the contemporary openness and heterogeneity of societies, their mobility, access to education and information, hegemony is not constructed in relation to the entire population, but rather to a part of it that enables the maintenance of power from one election to another. It is more about creating a kind of mega-social bubble that is resilient to the influence of political opponents, and is large enough to enable their marginalization. One side effect of this process may be the dysfunction of liberal democracy as such.
PiS started restructuring the whole system of the ISAs to strengthen its position as a ruling party and set out to establish a conservative hegemony that was based on Catholic nationalist values. All this involved a dismantling of the liberal democratic system. In the political ISA, the balance between different types of powers was upset, with the center of power moved from the government and the President to the headquarters of the ruling party, which is entirely dominated by its unquestioned leader, Jarosław Kaczyński. PiS pursued political centralization as it minimized the delegation of powers to lower levels, whether they be local governments or NGOs. In the legal ISA, the party took over the Constitutional Court and tried to exert direct influence on every level of the judiciary system. The quality of legislation was corrupted: lots of bills were passed by curtailing the legislative process and disregarding responsibility toward social partners, ignoring the need for public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny; sometimes legal procedures were outright violated. In the religious ISA, there was no separation of state and church: the Catholic Church enjoyed unconditional governmental support and the Catholic doctrine permeated various ISAs, especially the educational, cultural, family and legal. In the communications ISA, the public media was disintegrated, effectively transformed into a propaganda machine for the ruling party. Concurrently, PiS extended its control over a major part of the private press market. Independent broadcasters and publishers were put under informal financial pressure, while legal changes were initiated to keep them on a short leash. In the educational ISA, the entire system faced mounting domination from the Catholic nationalist ideology. PiS announced its history-oriented policy, which was aimed at constructing a one-dimensional, proud national community. Together with the Catholic system of values, it became an ideological matrix for the functioning of the other ISAs. Curricula underwent modifications to be in line with these tenets and education supervisors dominated school principals, teachers and parents. The position and prestige of educators suffered due to a systematic lack of financial backing. Furthermore, the Minister of Education and Science manually controlled the evaluation of higher education institutions and the allocation of funds. In the family ISA, the Constitutional Court, partially illegitimately seized by PiS, severely restricted access to abortion procedures. The endorsement of traditional family and gender roles was accompanied by an anti-feminist and vehemently anti-LGBTQ rhetoric. Alongside anti-elitist, anti-EU, and anti-immigrant stances, these sociotechnical maneuvers exacerbated social divisions, fostering a perpetual state of political and cultural war.
Finally, turning to the RSA, PiS granted special privileges to the secret services, deploying invasive spyware to surveil opposition figures, journalists, lawyers, and potentially even members of the party and the government. Controversial and oppressive actions by the police, along with their apparent incompetence, did not elicit an adequate response from the government. PiS also replaced the members of the military command and actively engaged the army in the election campaigns, using newly acquired weaponry as décor for party events. Additionally, the police and the public prosecutor’s office initiated legal proceedings against anti-government activists. Many artworks deemed incompatible with the party’s vision of culture were also targeted and some artists faced criminal indictments. Simultaneously, unofficial administrative interventions infringed the autonomy of cultural institutions. This escalating ideological, financial, legal and institutional pressure fostered self-censorship within the various art communities.
The Cultural ISA and the Field of Visual Art
Initially, PiS did not heavily rely on the Repressive Apparatus and instead focused efforts on executing hegemonic policy through Ideological State Apparatuses. But before we examine the party’s actions in the cultural ISA, it’s crucial to outline the main legal framework that had been established by the Act of October 25, 1991 on Organizing and Running Cultural Activity (Dz.U. 1991 nr 114 poz. 493). Broadly speaking, this legislation defines two types of public cultural institutions: those established, financed, and supervised by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and those established by local governments. As a result, it is the prerogative of the respective founder to conduct the appointment or dismissal of a cultural institution’s director. While it is mandatory to consult with the labor unions operating in the given cultural institution and the relevant professional associations, their opinions count only as advice. Additionally, the founder may choose to select a director through a competition, in which case consultation is not obligatory. However, the outcome of the competition does not bind the founder, who retains the authority to appoint a director arbitrarily. The co-management of institutions is also possible, and in such situations, the scope of competence between ministerial and local organizers is determined by the statute they have established for the given institution. It is evident that this regulatory framework grants politicians complete control over all types of cultural institutions. Significantly, for more than 30 years, none of the political parties in power, regardless of their ideological orientation, have taken steps to amend these regulations to enhance procedural transparency, provide greater autonomy to cultural institutions, and empower individual creative communities. It’s not surprising, then, that PiS itself started taking control over the cultural ISA without much hindrance: the role of the central government was strengthened, and many institutions came under the co-management of the Ministry of Culture; new institutions were established, and new programs, management and staff were introduced in the old ones; new procurement commissions and program councils were appointed; the funding for institutions, specialized press, artists, and scientists was subjected to strict control, with resources primarily directed towards individuals and organizations aligned with the government’s ideology.
It is worth stressing that the changes were carried out in a planned manner. The party first took control over the sectors with the strongest social impact, such as public mass media and the film industry. Then they started to pacify the theater scene. At the same time, PiS developed institutions vital for their newly declared history-oriented policy, which was the cornerstone of the party’s cultural agenda. One may argue, at the risk of simplification, that the political predecessors of PiS had sought autonomy for the cultural field, and let experts manage it. PiS subverted the principle: the authorities were not to support artists and institutions but to enforce compliance with the preferred ideology. The politicians claimed they represented the “Sovereign’s will” and it put them in a position to make demands of the artists. PiS claimed a left-wing or liberal agenda was overrepresented in culture. It was now time for art that criticized these stances and at the same time reinforced Polish national identity.[4] At best, that meant something safe—traditional, classical or academic.
Note that the visual arts did not play an important part in this cultural politics. The changes introduced by Minister of Culture Piotr Gliński in the field of the visual arts were fairly moderate in comparison to those made in other areas of culture. In 2020, he even relinquished co-management with the Warsaw city authorities of the local Museum of Contemporary Art, the most prominent institution in Poland devoted to the newest art. I believe this leniency can be attributed to two factors: the limited social influence of visual arts and a significant lack of right-wing conservative professionals. However, Gliński could not entirely neglect this sphere and took some steps that corresponded to those taken in the other areas of culture: new ministerial committees for the visual arts were established to promote grant applications that fit the government’s ideology; newly appointed bodies supervised the acquisitions of museums and galleries; Gliński regularly bypassed transparent procedures for selecting managers of the state-run museums and galleries. The minister arbitrarily appointed conservative directors for the National Museum in Warsaw (2018 and 2019), the National Museum in Krakow (2016 and 2019), the Center for Contemporary Art in Warsaw (2019), and the Zachęta National Gallery of Art in Warsaw (2022). When a proper competition had to be announced, as in the case of the National Museum in Poznań (2019) and the Museum of Art in Łódź (2022), the composition of the selection committees was politically controlled.
To Regain or to Recapture? – Visual Art Institutions in the Post-PiS Era
The context I have provided is indispensable not only for grasping the present situation in the realm of the visual arts in Poland but also for understanding what is at stake, the procedures undertaken and those left undone, the resentments accumulated, the emotions elicited and the challenges that lie ahead. Currently, with the new government taking over the State Apparatuses, there is a struggle to weaken and reverse the hegemonic relations established by PiS. They aim to rebuild the system of liberal democracy and, within it, to secure a hegemony of a liberal-leftist type. Culture serves as both a target and a weapon in these processes, within which visual art plays its own, albeit marginal, role.
In my analysis I would like to focus on the recent events in the Zachęta National Gallery of Art in Warsaw. This institution, under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture, might serve as an exemplar for the entire problem. At the end of 2021, Gliński designated Janusz Janowski as the new director of the Zachęta, which at that time was the last state-funded cultural institutions not connected to PiS. The former director, Hanna Wróblewska tried to strike a deal with the minister, and although the gallery program held high standards during her tenure, the growing political tension evidently stigmatized some of the exhibitions. The art community was hopeful that these subtle compromises would secure another term for Wróblewska, but not only did the minister refuse to renew her contract but also appointed her successor without a competition, disregarding the protests of the art community and the negative opinions of professional associations and gallery labor unions. Janowski simply did not have the required professional experience, knowledge, vision and recognition to run an institution of that size and importance. Instead, he was a fervent supporter of the right-wing government. This hostile–albeit legal—takeover of the Zachęta Gallery indicated that the PiS hegemonic policy in culture had reached its final stage and would be pursued uncompromisingly, regardless of the cost. The widespread opposition to Janowski suggested that he would need to be fully loyal to the minister to secure his position for the full term. Janowski’s program for the gallery and his subsequent activity as a director evinced this loyalty. The case of the Polish Pavilion at the Venice Biennale was a prime example.
The Zachęta operates the Pavilion, it is their responsibility to oversee the competition and to realize the winning project. Janowski appointed a predominantly conservative competition commission and assumed its leadership. The competition concluded shortly after PiS lost the parliamentary elections. Twenty-four projects were submitted. Though the theme of this year’s Biennale is Foreigners are Everywhere, the jury under Janowski selected a project entitled Polish Exercises in the Tragic Nature of the World: Between Germany and Russia, curated by Piotr Bernatowicz and Dariusz Karłowicz, with the participation of the painter Ignacy Czwartos. It included dozens of oil paintings by Czwartos, depicting Nazi and Communist oppressors as well as Polish victims, and a picture, Nord Stream 2, which shows Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel connected by a swastika. The project shared little with the Biennale theme but was perfectly aligned with the history-oriented policy of PiS. As the curators stated: “The Greeks invented tragedy. The Poles lived through it.”[5]
The jury’s decision sparked an intense controversy that extended beyond the visual arts community. To some extent, the commission had chosen Janowski’s own project, as a year earlier he and Bernatowicz had curated a similar exhibition of Czwartos’s work at the Zachęta. Bernatowicz has been director of the Center for Contemporary Art in Warsaw (CCA) since 2020. He was appointed to this position by Gliński without a competition and still remains a prominent figure in the PiS-led cultural revolution in the visual arts. His activities at the CCA often provoke resistance and controversy, with the majority of the community boycotting the institution.
However, on December 13, 2023, the new government was elected and PiS finally went into opposition. The counterrevolution began. The new Prime Minister, Donald Tusk appointed Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz the Minister of Culture and National Heritage. Sienkiewicz, apart from being a grandson of the Polish Nobel Prize-winning writer Henryk Sienkiewicz, is a politician with little connection to culture but with extensive political experience, notably gained while serving as Minister of Internal Affairs in the pre-PiS era. His person signaled the new government’s commitment to the cultural ISA. The crucial task at hand was to regain control over the public media, where PiS had secured its grip with specially crafted regulations, additionally guarded by the Constitutional Court and President Duda. At the same time, on the margins of this primary battleground, Sienkiewicz carried out maneuvers in other cultural arenas. As early as December 22, he fired Janowski. The minister stressed that the director had failed to execute his program of promoting artists, and to realize the exhibitions and events planned. Furthermore, he neglected to submit the required report on program implementation and failed to establish the Program Council, a statutory body of the Zachęta. The minister, in line with legal requirements, also sought the opinions of relevant trade unions and professional associations. Significantly, none of the opinions presented questioned the minister’s intention to dismiss Janowski.[6] It’s worth noting that according to the Act on Organizing and Running Cultural Activity, the director of a public cultural institution can be dismissed before the end of their term only if one of five strictly defined conditions are met, two of which may be relevant here: violation of laws related to the position held, and neglect of contract implementation, part of which is the institution program presented by a director to the founder. It appears that the minister had solid grounds for Janowski’s dismissal, who simply became a victim of his own incompetence. Janowski, however, considered the decision unlawful. He accused the minister of “an attack on artistic freedom,” contempt for artists, “who, thanks to the Zachęta’s openness to new artistic environments, could be discovered and appreciated.” He also criticized—however cynical that might sound—“the break from the good practice of keeping the most important cultural institutions free from party politics.”[7] Importantly, any disputes arising from the ministerial decision can still be settled by an independent court, and the minister will undoubtedly respect its verdict, which was not the rule during the PiS era.[8]
Janowski’s dismissal allowed Sienkiewicz to make another critical decision a week later: “after an analysis of the competition procedures for the exhibition project […] and in consideration of the opinions and voices of various stakeholders, the Minister, currently serving as Commissioner of the Polish Pavilion at the Venice Biennale, has accepted the decision not to implement the project ‘Polish Exercises in the Tragedy of the World: Between Germany and Russia’[…]. Instead, in adherence to the regulations, the backup project, ‘Repeat After Me,’ curated by Marta Czyż with the participation of the Open Group (Yuriy Biley, Pavlo Kovach, Anton Varga), has been selected for implementation.”[9]
Here we have reached the other, in my view, less convincing side of the counterrevolution. To begin with, the ministerial statement is rather vague: we do not know which procedures he analyzed and questioned, nor do we know the legal grounds upon which he made his decision. Competition Rule No. 16 states only that “when objective reasons and/or a force majeure prevails (e.g. illness of team members, technical and logistical difficulties), the Organizer [Zachęta represented by its director] may be exempted from proceeding with the Selected Project. The decision not to implement the project requires approval from the Minister.”[10] It appears that, apart from some other doubts, none of these conditions prevailed, and the decision was made simply because it was believed it would not cause any political side effects. It is crucial to be aware of the fact that the political and social costs of changes in the visual art field in Poland are insignificant in comparison to the battles fought over public media, the judiciary, public prosecution or the secret services. With all due respect, the Zachęta Gallery or the pavilion in Venice is not the Polish Television, the Supreme Court, or the General Prosecutor’s Office. On the other hand, the same perhaps could also be a reason to allow at least some of the PiS-led cultural projects to reach their conclusions. In other words, I would let the conservative part of the art community confront international criticism at the Venice Biennale and be reflected in a mirror not distorted by domestic conflicts. Although I am not enthusiastic about the “Polish Exercises” project, it is essential to remember that PiS, even after the lost elections, maintains the highest level of popular support among all the political parties (with 7,650,000 votes). This support base includes members of our families, friends, colleagues, neighbors, students, etc. Why should we completely dismiss their agenda, violate legal decisions, or ignore their emotions? Are we not portraying ourselves as the righteous ones, those who uphold the ideals of democratic rule of law—or at least aspire to them? Is a hard, growing resentment over eight years sufficient justification for this action? Should we further entrench ourselves in our positions, burn all bridges, and keep cultivating a deeply divided society? But let’s consider more practical or cynical questions: is the current political situation permanent, or is there a possibility that after the next elections we will find ourselves in the current position of PiS supporters? What then? Will the pendulum, swinging forcefully back to the right, sweep aside everything in its path? Perhaps it is worth sacrificing occasional short-term benefits to win arguments in the long haul? Especially because the cancellation of Czwartos’s exhibition fosters conspiracy theories among PiS supporters and creates right-wing martyrs. Bernatowicz is right when he calls the cancellation an act of political and ideological censorship, but he also interprets the problem as if it were a left-liberal collusion, involving the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, the art magazine Szum, and the British newspaper The Guardian, along with the anti-PiS artistic and political establishment.[11] In this narrative, the whole “Zachęta case” was not just an administrative decision to remove the incompetent director and an ideologically inconvenient, as well as substantively problematic, project: it was a conspiracy of international leftists forces against the Polish raison d’état. This way, an entire conservative mythology is formed, which cements right-wing communities and will undoubtedly be exploited by them in political conflicts.
Conclusion
Let’s note, however, that Bernatowicz announces his theories while still holding the directorial position at the CCA. This is simply because Bernatowicz, unlike Janowski, is a fairly experienced, self-aware and professional administrator, and there is no legal justification for his dismissal. Which helps us to sum up the issues at stake. Firstly, there is no conspiracy. Secondly, the governmental policy is inconsistent. Sienkiewicz regains, rather than recaptures cultural institutions, although he explicitly admitted: “We must carry out some butchery, in any case.”[12] He sometimes appoints directors without competitions[13] or resorts to various legal maneuvers, such as merging institutions to create new ones, which then enables him to pursue his own personnel policy,[14] but mostly tries to adhere to the letter of the law. This is evidenced, along with Bernatowicz’s case, by another PiS appointee, Andrzej Biernacki. In November 2022, after winning a competition, Biernacki was appointed by Minister Gliński to the position of director of the Museum of Art in Łódź. He followed Jarosław Suchan, an outstanding professional with incomparably greater curatorial achievements, management experience and standing in the field. Although under Biernacki’s leadership, one of the most important museums in Poland significantly reduced its program on every level, Minister Sienkiewicz does not react because there are no formal grounds for dismissal. Therefore—thirdly—decisions such as that on the Polish Pavilion should be considered mistakes. The Ministry stretched low ranking regulations (the Competition Rules rather than laws) and simultaneously took advantage of the niche status of the Pavilion in the scale of political problems in the country. However, the new government must avoid such unlawful actions within the cultural sphere and all other State Apparatuses. They also need to act as transparently as possible, organizing open competitions for directorial posts. The rebuilding of liberal democracy cannot be burdened with the original sins of lawlessness, vague procedures and political cronyism. Furthermore, within the democratic frame, one should not, and perhaps cannot, marginalize nearly 8 million citizens who supported PiS at the last elections. How to live together, rather than alongside or against each other, is the big question many democratic societies face today.
[1] Elections in 2015: https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.html; elections in 2023: https://wybory.gov.pl/sejmsenat2023/ (accessed 2 April 2024).
[2] Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (Monthly Review Press, 1971), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm.
[3] Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, 2013).
[4] See e.g. an interview with minister Piotr Gliński: „Rzeczpospolita”, https://www.rp.pl/plus-minus/art39072191-piotr-glinski-dbamy-o-artystow-lepiej-niz-poprzednicy (accessed 2 April 2024).
[5] Piotr Bernatowicz, Ignacy Czwartos, and Dariusz Karłowicz, “Polskie Ćwiczenia z Tragiczności Świata Między Niemcami a Rosją,” accessed April 2, 2024, https://labiennale.art.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/27-Polskie-cwiczenia-z-tragicznosci-swiata-polaczono-II-etap.pdf.
[6] https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/minister-kultury-i-dziedzictwa-narodowego-odwolal-dyrektora-zachety—narodowej-galerii-sztuki (accessed 2 April 2024).
[7] https://wpolityce.pl/kultura/675659-odwolano-dyrektora-zachety-cios-zadany-pluralizmowi (accessed 2 April 2024).
[8] It refers to both the international courts rulings (ECHR and CJEU) and the national courts rulings. See e.g.: https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/wpis-w-debacie/__trashed-7/; https://www.zawszepomorze.pl/artykul/4023,nie-przepraszaja-bo-nie-musza-o-tym-jak-politycy-nie-wykonuja-wyrokow-sadow (accessed 2 April 2024).
[9] https://labiennale.art.pl/konkurs/ (accessed 2 April 2024).
[10] file:///Users/jakubdabrowski/Downloads/WENECJA_Regulamin_Sztuka_2024.pdf (accessed 2 April 2024).
[11] Piotr Bernatowicz, “Jak Cenzurować Sztukę – Kalendarium Albo Instrukcja (How to Censor Art – Timeline or Instruction),” Cenzura Po Wenecku (blog), September 20, 2023, https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/minister-kultury-i-dziedzictwa-narodowego-odwolal-dyrektora-zachety—narodowej-galerii-sztuki.
[12] Witold Mrozek, “‘Rzeźnicka Praca’ Sienkiewicza. Minister Nie Chce Rydzyka, Pozwie Świrskiego,” Wyborcza.Pl, February 15, 2024, https://wyborcza.pl/7,75410,30704811,rzeznicka-praca-sienkiewicza-minister-nie-chce-rydzyka-pozwie.html.
[13] Sienkiewicz arbitrarily appointed the directors of The National Centre for Culture and The Book Institute.
[14] The minister merged the Adam Mickiewicz Institute and the “Niepodległa” Bureau. Both institutions were responsible for the international promotion of Polish culture.
Bibliography
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben Brewster. Monthly Review Press, 1971. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm
Bernatowicz, Piotr. “Jak Cenzurować Sztukę – Kalendarium Albo Instrukcja (How to Censor Art – Timeline or Instruction).” Cenzura Po Wenecku (blog), September 20, 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/minister-kultury-i-dziedzictwa-narodowego-odwolal-dyrektora-zachety—narodowej-galerii-sztuki
Bernatowicz, Piotr, Ignacy Czwartos, and Dariusz Karłowicz. “Polskie Ćwiczenia z Tragiczności Świata Między Niemcami a Rosją.” Accessed April 2, 2024. https://labiennale.art.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/27-Polskie-cwiczenia-z-tragicznosci-swiata-polaczono-II-etap.pdf
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Verso, 2013.
Mrozek, Witold. “‘Rzeźnicka Praca’ Sienkiewicza. Minister Nie Chce Rydzyka, Pozwie Świrskiego.” Wyborcza.Pl, February 15, 2024. https://wyborcza.pl/7,75410,30704811,rzeznicka-praca-sienkiewicza-minister-nie-chce-rydzyka-pozwie.html
Jakub Dąbrowski holds degrees in both law and the history of art. In 2013, he completed his PhD thesis at the Faculty of History of Art at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. He currently serves as an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Artistic Research and Curatorial Studies at the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw. He is the author of the book titled “Cenzura w sztuce polskiej po 1989 roku” (English edition: “Censorship in Polish Art after 1989: Art, Law, Politics,” published by Mosaic Press in 2019).
